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•FINANCIAL REPORTING FOR FOREIGN EXCHANGE DERIVATIVES
SYNOPSIS: A major objective of the FASB's financial instruments project, inclusive of
SFAS 105, SFAS 107 and SFAS 119, is to provide information useful to investors in
assessing the credit and market risk associated with the use of off-balance-sheet financial
instruments. We survey 1992 SFAS 105 and SFAS 107 disclosures on Foreign Exchange
Derivatives (FXD) to: (1) benchmark current practice by summarizing quantitative and
qualitative disclosures of FXD, and (2) examine the usefulness of current disclosures in
assessing market and credit risk related to FXD. In achieving these objectives, we provide
insight into how leading U.S. multinationals operationalize accounting standards related to
off-balance-sheet fmancial instruments and identify disclosure attributes of footnotes
unarticulated to the fmancial statements.
We conclude from our survey that (1) some firms make extensive use of FXD, (2)
there is substantial compliance with SFAS 105 and SFAS 107 requirements, (3) large dealers
comply with the FASB's credit risk disclosure requirements, (4) book and fair values of FXD
are small relative to contract and notional amounts and (5) disclosures providing infonnation
on market risk are deficient due to lack of both specificity and quantification.
Data Availability: Data used for this study are publicly available.
Introduction
The groWth of off-balance-sheet financial instruments (i.e., derivatives), the dynamic
state of fmancial markets, the complexity of financial engineering and the potential impact of
derivatives on profitability and risk, led the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) to
I
establish a fmancial instruments project in 1986. A5 a first step, the FASB issued an
exposure draft (ED) Disclosures about Financial Instruments (1987) and then two statements
requiring less disclosure than the ED. SFAS 105, Disclosure of Information about Financial
Instruments with Off-Balance-Sheet Risk and Financial Instruments with Concentrations of
•
Credit Risk (FASB 1990), requires disclosure of the contract amount of financial instruments
with off-balance sheet (OBS) risk of loss. SFAS 107, Disclosures about Fair Value of
Financial Instruments (FASB 1991), requires disclosure of the fair value of all frnancial
instruments. More recently, SFAS 119, Disclosure about Derivative Financial Instruments
and Fair Value of Financial Instruments (FASB 1994) requires disclosure of average fair
value of and net trading gains and losses for derivatives held for trading purposes. For
derivatives held for purposes other than trading, it requires disclosure about purposes, how the
instruments are reported in the financial statements and additional infonnation for hedges of
anticipated transactions.
SFAS 105 and SFAS 107 disclosures provide a mandated source of information about
["mancial instruments. SFAS 119 disclosures are not available at this writing. Footnotes
appearing in 1992 annual reports reveal how firms deal with both the expanded content and
the unstructured fonnat of the new disclosures which extend the scope of fmancial reporting
to unarticulated positions rather than just providing details of existing account balances.
The diSclosures provide some details of these previously unreported instruments used
extensively by ["manciaI companies to service customers and generate income and by both
["mancial and nonf'mancial companies to manage foreign currency exposure. The six banks
which dominate U.S. markets held contract values of foreign exchange derivatives totaling
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$3.2 ($4.2) trillion dollars. This is 4.2 (4.7) times total assets, at December 31, 1992 (1993).
In contrast, multinational manufacturers in our sample held foreign exchange derivatives with
contract value equal to 10.3% of their total assets at December 31, 1992.
Derivatives, if naked, increase the leverage and risk of the firm. The same level of
derivatives, if covered, reduces the risk of the finn. Under present reporting, neither
quantification of exposure nor consistent disclosure of finns' approach to risk management is
provided. Moreover, interrelated transactions (the hedged transaction and the hedging
instrument) appear separately in frnancial statements. Lack of quantification and failure to
separate the hedge instrument from the hedged item make it difficult for the reader to
measure the firm's exposure to exchange rate changes and determine to what extent FXD
increase or decrease exposure.
The next section discusses the general nature of disclosures. The third section reviews
extant and developing GAAP related to foreign exchange derivatives (FXD). The fourth
section provides analysis of existing disclosures by finns in our sample. The final section
presents our conclusions.
The Nature of Disclosures
GAAP-required footnote disclosures differ in the degree to which they are quantifiable
and testable. A disclosure asserting a finn "never speculates" is different from one that
asserts "the foreign currency position value at risk has not exceeded $xxx at a 99%
confidence level in 1993." The latter statement, in tum, is less quantified than one providing
maximum, minimum, and average foreign currency values at risk at some confidence level for
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Ia specific period.
GAAP-:required footnote disclosures also differ in that they mayor may not provide
the constituents of a control account articulated into the income statement and balance sheet
An articulating footnote "deepens" an existing line item disclosure. By contrast, a footnote
may "broaden" disclosure by introducing data points not constituents of an account articulated
into the general ledger. Requiring a footnote that extends the architecture of fmancial
reporting "off-balance sheet" (OBS), as the slang goes, means the standard cannot presume
that firms already have the model and the experience for reporting such data. If the
respondent is given cane blanche, open-ended responses may not be commensurable or even
yield summary statistics. Footnote disclosures of derivative fair values have the
undifferentiated alternatives of duplicating, adjusting or augmenting booked accruals of gains
or losses.
A broadening type footnote containing information unarticulated to the fmancial
statements cannot merely be a fishing expedition whose net benefit is a matter of chance, any
more than scientific research can test without a model. A "disclosure" type SFAS differs
methodologically from a Discussion Memorandum (OM) surveying the same issues. If a
disclosure standard is to generate an inductive inference, then the design calls for respondents
to answer the same questions and interpret them equivalently. The OBS disclosure of
operating leases presents a successful analogy. The FASB hypothesis is that footnote
disclosure of prospective uncapitalized, noncancellable commitments inhibits evasion of
capitalization requirements and expands the empirical data for estimating leveraging risk.
One purpose of our study is to detennine what inferences can be drawn from the 1992 data
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on FXD. Our survey leads us to conclude that the lack of clearly specified quantification of
market risk has lead to disclosures of limited benefit to investors.
FXD THEORY AND PRACTICE
•
Off-balance-sheet risk exists when a possible loss is not reflected on the balance sheet
because a derivative contract is not allowed as an asset or liability. Since open foreign
currency contracts are executory in nature, they are not booked (i.e., no asset or liability is
recorded) and the notional or contract amount is not articulated on the balance sheet.
Exposed derivatives may increase OBS risk whereas hedging derivatives decrease risk.
Therefore, deciding~whether FXD expose or cover risk is of substantial concern to investors
and regulators. Accelerating use of FXD by financial institutions particularly, and by
nonfmancial entities also, is a major motivation for the FASB undertaking their fmancial
instruments projects.
SFAS 105 (FASB 1990) was the initial response to calls for expanded disclosure
under the FASB's fmancial instruments project. It "applies to all fmancial instruments with
off-balance-sheet risk of accounting loss and all financial instruments with concentrations of
credit risk except those specifically excluded .... II Disclosures required by SFAS 105 consists
of the following information about financial instruments with risk of accounting loss: (a) the
face or contract amount (or notional principal amount), and (b) the nature and terms,
including a discussion of (1) the credit and market risk of those instruments, (2) the cash
requirements of those instruments, and (3) the related accounting policy. If the ['mancial
,.
instrument has off-balance-sheet credit risk, two additional disclosures are required, (1) the
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•potential loss due to nonperformance by the counterparty, and (2) infonnation about collateral.
SFAS 105 was issued in March 1990 and is effective for fIscal years ending after June 15,
1990. This study addresses only foreign currency contracts with OBS risk (FXD) and not
other fmancial instruments addressed by SFAS 105. Foreign exchange exposure for
nonfmancial fIrms is generally managed at the transaction or account level. Therefore,
corporate objectives are more easily defIned and it is more feasible for fIrms to monitor usage
of foreign exchange contracts as compared to interest rate contracts. FXD are usually "plain
vanilla" forwards, options, or currency swaps in comparison to complex interest rate contracts.
The use of interest rate contracts is analogous to capital structure decisions and is therefore
more difficult to defIne and to monitor.
SFAS 107 (FASB 1991) "requires disclosures about fair value for all fmancial
instruments, whether recognized or not recognized in the statement of financial position,
except for those specifically listed...." Similar to SFAS 105, items covered by other SFAS
such as pensions, insurance contracts, warranty obligations, lease contracts and investments
accounted for under the equity method are excluded from the disclosure requirements.
Fair value is quoted market value where available. Otherwise, it is management's best
estimate using the quoted market price of similar financial instruments, present value of
estimated cash flows, option pricing models, or other pricing models. The FASB chose the
term fair value as opposed to market value to avoid any misunderstanding that the statement
applies both to actively traded financial instruments where a clear market price does exist and
to those where no active market exists. Where it is not possible or practical (e.g., too costly)
•
to determine market value, available information to proxy for market value should be
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•disclosed (carrying amount, interest rate, and maturity). The FASB valuation defInition is
flexible in that neither spot nor forward rates are specified. SFAS 107 is effective for fiscal
years ending after December 15, 1992. For entities with total assets less than $150 million,
the standard is effective for fiscal years ending after December 15, 1995.
In October 1994, the FASB issued SFAS 119, Disclosure about Derivative Financial
Instruments and Fair Value of Financial Instruments, as a response to criticism of derivatives
disclosure. It requires a distinction be made between derivatives held for trading purposes
and those held for purposes "other than trading." The FASB explains that this distinction is
not one between speculation and hedging, which is what everyone recommends in theory but
no one has operationalized in practice. Segregating trading and nontrading instruments (risk
management or asset-liability management(ALM» is what banks already do as a matter of
business practice and nonbanks may choose to ignore.
Additional disclosures required for derivatives held for trading purposes are average
and end-of-period fair values, and gains and losses on trading activities disaggregated into
categories consistent with how the business is managed. The FASB dropped a requirement
from the related disclosure draft to disclose minimum and maximum fair values, and gains
and losses from derivatives shown separately from other financial instruments. Additional
disclosures required for derivative financial instruments held for purposes other than trading
consists of (a) a description of the objectives for holding the derivatives, (b) a description of
how each class of derivatives is reported in the fmancial statements, and (c) for derivatives
held and accounted for as hedges of anticipated transactions "(1) a description of the
I
anticipated transactions whose risks are hedged, including the period of time until the
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anticipated transactions are expected to occur, (2) a description of the classes of derivatives
used to hedge the anticipated transactions, (3) the amount of hedging gains and losses
explicitly deferred, and (4) a description of the transactions or other events that result in the
recognition in earnings of gains or losses deferred by hedge accounting." The disclosures
required under (c) are an attempt to clarify the gray area between derivatives used to hedge
anticipated transactions and to speculate.
Additional encouraged but not required disclosures include average fair values of other
fmancial instruments or nonfinancial assets held for trading purposes, quantitative information
about market risks of derivatives "that is consistent with the way in which the entity manages
or adjusts those risks." Although this is the first time the FASB encouraged market risk
disclosures, SFAS 119 requires neither quantification of exposure to market risk nor a
discussion of management's controls on currency risk management. Dealer banks use value
at risk for internal control, but typically have not reported it publicly. SFAS 119 is effective
for fiscal years ending after December 15, 1994 (December 15, 1995 for entities with less
than $150 million in total assets).
Derivatives are subject to the same types of liquidity, market, credit and operational
risks as other fmancial instruments (CmCORP 1994, 26). Market risk is the risk of loss due
to unexpected changes in interest and exchange rates. Credit risk is the potential loss from
counterparty nonperformance. Liquidity risk is related to market liquidity of instruments held
and therefore, closely related to market risk. Operating risk is linked to inadequate controls
that ensure following a properly defined corporate policy.
a
Whether companies are dealers or end-users, FXD manage and adjust market and
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credit risks. Market risk on an exposed position can be eliminated (hedged) by FXD with the
opposite exposure. In a pure sense, hedging is risk reduction without intent to profit. A
speculative FXD, however, is one that does not hedge an identified exposure or perversely
unhedges natural offsetting positions. A company's risk management policy detennines the
portfolio of exposures which they identify. For example, is every foreign-currency
denominated receivable, payable, contractually committed future sale or purchase, and
anticipated revenue or expenditure (for the next three months, one year, five years, etc.)
identified as exposed to exchange rate changes? Or, is only some decentralized entity's net
amount identifiable as expos.ed? Definition, measurement of market risk and detennination
of an acceptable level of exposure are complex issues about which treatment may differ by
industry, geography, technical feasibility, and management policy.
FASB disclosure requirements address credit and market risks. Recent disclosures in
the fmancial press (e.g., Procter & Gamble, Gibson Greeting's) suggest market risk is less
understood and less controlled than credit risk but not necessarily less important. Long
before 1994 revelations of derivative losses, the FASB issued the exposure draft Disclosures
about Financial Instruments (1987). This proposal omitted notional and market values of
derivative contracts and relied instead on quantification of cash flows and tableaux of position
profIles over time. TheSe numerical specifications at the enterprise level have been dropped
from subsequent standards and proposals in favor of verbalized descriptions and
nonstandardized views of historical data resulting in inconsistent content and fonnats.
Credit risk, which relates to the possibility of nonperfonnance by a counterparty,
•
applies to FXD entered into by both dealers and end-users, and to those entered both for
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•hedging exposures and for speculating. The maximum potential accounting loss at a balance
sheet date, SFAS 105's (FASB 1990) measure of credit risk, is the gross amount of contracts
in a gain position (modified by losses that can be offset under a binding agreement). Credit
risk, measured by observed gains on derivatives, is not a proxy measure of market risk, which
is measured by potential, unobservable derivative losses. The FASB, regulators, and rating
agencies set thresholds of credit risk because business practice deems it measurable and
avoidable, whereas market risk is viewed as neither. Thus, outside regulators neither monitor
nor restrict market risk-taking directly yet.
[Table 1]
The four cells of Table 1 relate to disclosure as follows. For credit risk (two bottom
cells), SFAS 105 requires disclosure of the maximum potential accounting loss due to
counterparty nonperfonnance and a discussion of the finn's credit controls. By contrast, FXD
reduce net enterprise market risk exposure when other exposures are hedged (upper left cell).
The major uncertainty, and therefore need for disclosure, is exposure to market risk of FXD
held for speculation (upper right cell), whether intentional or not. The disclosure challenge
is to distinguish between enterprise level exposures and hedges and then to measure the
speculative value at risk. The FASB requires disclosure 9f FXD contractual amounts and fair
values and a "discussion" of their market risk. The remainder of the paper shows that while
the required disclosures are a step in the right direction, quantifying the exposure of unhedged
derivatives to market risk is a necessary but missing component of FXD disclosure.
FXD DISCLOSURES
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aThis study includes a descriptive analysis of the SFAS 105 and SFAS 107 disclosures
of six large banks that dominate U.S. derivative markets and 98 large U.S. multinational
manufacturing companies for fiscal years ending December 1992 through March 1993. To
obtain a purposiv'e sample of major FXD users, we selected (1) the 100 firms on Forbes' list
of the largest U.S. Multinationals, (2) the firms on Fortune's listof the 50 largest U.S.
exporters not included in Forbes' list, and (3) U.S. companies not yet included that are in the
Standard & Poor 500 and classified as Banks, Chemicals, Computers, Electronic Components,
Pharmaceuticals, and Oils. To focus the survey on large U.S. manufacturing multinationals,
we excluded firms with ratios of foreign assets to total assets or foreign sales to total sales
less than 10% (22 finns) and retailers (8 finns).
SFAS 105 and SFAS 107 disclosures by finns in our survey vary greatly in format
and content. One area where companies showed inconsistency is in use of terminology. The
primary example is the distinction between contract and fair value. Several companies used
terminology treating contract values and fair values as equivalent (e.g., Intergraph, Cray).
Contract (notional) value is the amount of currency to exchange at a defined time in the
future. Fair value of a contract is determined by changes in exchange rates (and possibly by
interest rates and other factors) applied to the notional base. Changes in a contract's fair
value impacts income, if the contract is not construed as hedged. If there is no change in
exchange rates since the inception of the contract, its fair value is ,within transactions costs of
zero. Fair value disclosures are also frequently unclear about whether the amount is an asset
or liability, a deficiency addressed in SFAS 119 (FASB 1994).
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Dealer Banks
The total notional value of foreign exchange contracts of the six dominant U.S. banks
is $3.2 ($4.2) trillion or 4.2 (4.7) times total assets at December 31, 1992 (1993). Foreign
exchange trading income totaled $2.7 (2.3) billion, which was 30.3% (17.4%) of pretax
income in 1992 (1993). Table 2 summarizes reported FXD for 1992 and 1993 for
comparison.
[Table 2]
Banks foreign exchange dealings are exposed to market (or price), liquidity,
operational, and credit risks. Banks apply similar credit procedures to customers with whom
they enter into forward contracts as with loan agreements. In tenus of amount at risk in case
of default, it is approximately equal to the unexpected change in the exchange rate since the
contract was signed times the notional amount for all contracts in a gain position. The
maximum exposure to credit loss reported by the six banks is $80.4 ($54.0) billion in 1992
(1993) or 2.5% (1.3%) of notional value and 10.5% (6.1%) of total assets. Nonfmancial
companies entering into FXD generally do so with financial institutions, so that their credit
risk is the risk of insolvency of the financial institution. The "too big to fail" rule may
protect banks' customers, but not U.S. taxpayers.
Dealer banks, as well as end-users, failed in their 1993 disclosures to address vital
issues surfacing in 1994 related to market risk and liquidity risk. Disclosures do not provide
(a) amounts exposed to market risk, (b) the effect of FXD on exposure to market risk, and (c)
any information, qualitative or quantitative, on liquidity risk.
CmCORP (1O-Q for quarter ended June 30, 1994) provides the first reported
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quantification of market risk.
Earnirigs at risk measures the potential impact on the nontrading portfolios of a
specified movement in interest rates for a given period. The earnings at risk for each
currency is calculated by multiplying the gap between interest sensitive items by the
specified rate movement. and then taking into account the impact of options, both .
explicit and embedded. The specific rate movements are statistically derived from a
two standard deviation rate movement.. .
...The price risk of the trading portfolios is measured using the potential loss amount
method, which estimates the sensitivity of the value of the trading positions to changes
in the various market factors, such as interest and foreign exchange rates, over the
period necessary to close the position (generally one day). The method considers the
probability of movements of these market factors (as derived from a two standard
deviation movement), adjusted for correlation among them. (CITICORP 1994, 24)
Reported amounts calculated for market risk are small relative to credit risk.
Disclosed earnings at risk from changes in market rates for the nontrading portfolio ranges
from a high of $90 million to a low of $10 million dollars in the first half of the year. This
market risk range is from 4.24% to .47% of the first six months pretax income and .58% to
.06% of stockholders' equity. The potential loss to the trading portfolio ranges from $90
million to $50 million (4.24% to 2.36% and .58% to .32%). CmCORP's maximum exposure
to credit loss (i.e., gross unrealized gains net of netting agreement offsets) on FXD was $32.0
billion or 205% of Stockholders' equity at June 30, 1994 (1509% of pretax income).
Industry practice is for banks to accrue unrealized gains and losses on foreign
exchange contracts, interest rate swaps, and interest rate protection contracts, offset on a net
basis through 1993. Beginning in 1994, FASB Interpretation 39, Offsetting ofAmounts
Related to Cenain Contracts (FASB 1992), requires banks to report separately their
unrealized gains as assets and unrealized losses as liabilities. Unrealized gains and losses on
multiple contracts may continue to be shown on a net basis only when the contracts are
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executed with the same counterparty and a legally enforceable master netting agreement is in
place and where the intent to settle net exists. Federal Reserve and Group-of-30 (1993)
. surveys document banks are planning to substantially increase the use of master netting
agreements. While application of FASB Interpretation 39 does not affect net income or net
,
assets, it does increase total assets and liabilities. This disaggregation enables analysts to
better discern the scale of hedging and speculation.
cmcoRP's (1994) second quarter, 1994 lO-Q provides insight into the effect of
Interpretation 39 on the balance sheet. At June 30, 1994 Trading Account Assets ($52
Billion) and Total Assets ($254 Billion) are $30 billion higher than previously reported
because gross unrealized gains of $32 billion (asset) and gross unrealized losses of $30 billion
(liability) were separately reported. The result is to reduce the ratio of Stockholders Equity to
Total Assets from 6.9% under previous GAAP to 6.1 % under current GAAP. Similarly, the
ratio of Net Income to Total Assets falls from .64% to .56%.
Since banks mark-to-market their trading portfolios of foreign exchange contracts,
there are no reported differences between book value and fair value, except for their Asset
Liability Management (ALM) end-user positions. The SFAS 105 disclosures provide new
information on the open interest of OBS instruments. By the nature of their usage, bank
foreign exchange contracts substantially offset, reduce the bank's exposure or "gap," and thus
reduce the risk premium to recover from customers. Where end-user companies use foreign
exchange contracts to hedge operating exposure however, SFAS 105 tabulations do noi
display their offset against foreign currency assets and liabilities on the balance sheet. The
result is either of limited value or misleading.
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End-User Manufacturing Companies
End-user fInns in the manufacturing sector provide a rigorous test of FASB derivative
disclosure standards in that these fIrms have limited experience with disclosures or footnotes
related to foreign exchange risk. To develop a more relevant survey, we restrict the sample
to companies which are multinational and therefore more likely to use FXD to manage risk.
Identical to the SFAS 14 requirement for providing geographic disclosures, we defme
companies as multinational if foreign revenue is 10% or more of consolidated revenue or
identifIable foreign assets are 10% or more of consolidated total assets. The sample analyzed
in this section consists of 98 V.S. multinational manufacturing fIrms.
FXD disclosures are located in a variety of footnotes including one or more covering
accounting policies, foreign exchange, debt, fInancial instruments, commitments,
contingencies, and geographic disclosures. Footnotes are frequently not cross-referenced
making it diffIcult to know if all FXD disclosures have been identifIed.
We tabulated currency swap agreements when they were identifIable separately from
interest rate swaps. Johnson & Johnson's annual report, for example, did not include
currency swaps with OBS activity. Instead, ECU and Swiss Franc notes payable were listed
under borrowings with a note indicating "These debt issues were converted to fIxed or
floating rate V.S. dollar liabilities via interest rate and currency swaps." This contract
interdependence highlights the need to link disaggregated disclosure of OBS instruments in
order to understand exposures. (SFAS 119 addresses this concern.) Some companies
describe separately the type of foreign exchange contract and others combine amounts for
different types of contracts.
15
[Table 3]
Table 3 shows the incidence of revelation (panel A) and descriptive statistics for
notional (Panel B), Book (panel C), and Fair (panel D) values for FXD user fInns in the
sample. Since S'FAS 107 requires fair value disclosures, we assume that no disclosure of
book and fair values implies book approximates fair value for fInns disclosing notional
amounts of FXD.
Panel A of Table 3 shows that 82 of the 98 U.S. companies disclosed the notional
value of FXD. Only twenty-nine companies disclosed notional, book and fair values
separately. Forty-two companies disclosed only notional value. Frequently book and fair
values were not disclosed. In summary, notional values are generally reported, but the
reporting of book and fair values is inconsistent. However, three companies reported no
notional value but did report fair and/or book values. Since SFAS 105 requires disclosure of
notional amounts of FXD, these three companies do not appear to be in compliance with
GAAP.
The mean (median) notional amount of FXD for users in our sample was $1.54 ($.57)
billion dollars (Table 3, Panel B). The mean (median) ratio of notional value of FXD to
total assets is .103 (.068) for the 82 manufacturing firms that report usage of FXD. Of those
fIrms reporting type of FXD, about two-thirds use GTC forward contracts and one-fourth are
swaps. Since some companies did not identify currency and interest rate swap amounts
separately, the incidence of FX swaps and total FXD is understated. This survey confmns
that although FXD usage is frequently substantial, it is not systematically material across
manufacturers.
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Panels C and D of Table 3 show approximately 3% of the notional or contract
amounts of FXD are reported on the balance sheet and replacement cost or fair value of FXD
is 4% of the contract amount. Because of inconsistencies in reporting, only approximately
one-third of sample fInns report enough infonnation to calculate these ratios. Whether these
are debits (credit risk), credits, both, or net is rarely clear. Manufacturing fIrms generally do
not report separate credit risk amounts as banks do. Some manufacturing fInns do however,
indicate risk of credit loss is remote since counterparties are large credit-worthy fInancial
institutions.
The FASB's hypothesis that FXD credit risk is a major concern for users and therefore
should be a major disclosure component is perhaps misguided because amounts at risk are
small (for the manufacturing fInns) and the counterparties are credit-worthy. If compliance
costs are constrained, why should the FASB waste resources by requiring extensive
disclosures of credit risk, when market risk and liquidity risk are the perils to end-user fInns?
Our conclusion is that dealer banks complied fully with SFAS 105 and SFAS 107 and could
have provided a model for manufacturing fInns whose compliance was spotty.
Appendix B of SFAS 105 provides an example of inconSIstent fInancial reporting
treatment by presenting a concept of credit risk contrary to bank practice, regulations, and the
predecessor FASB ED. Setting aside any questions as to how "credit risk" is actually
measured, the table on pages 22-23 of SFAS 105 shows no OBS credit risk for swaps and
forwards, yet shows market risk for all derivatives. By contrast, banks report credit risk for
all over-the-counter derivatives, except options. Recall that Interpretation 39 generally
requires gross, not net, unrealized gains and losses be reported on the balance sheet and thus
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unrealized gains (FASB's measure of maximum credit loss) are now on the balance sheet.
Thus, it is not until Interpretation 39 that financial reporting is consistent with the appendix to
SFAS 105.
Liquidity risk, in the sense of market failure, is perhaps the greatest problem of all in
reporting the fair value of derivative positions. While the ED preceding SFAS 105 identifies
liquidity risk using a cashflow definition, SFAS 105 drops it from the appendix entirely. The
market in 1994 however, has demonstrated that only plain vanilla derivatives can be resold
without significant cost when the market begins to inflict losses. In summary, it appears the
FASB hypothesizes that a measure of usage (i.e., notional amount) serves as a metric for
market risk.
Appendix A to the ED preceding SFAS 107 enumerates prior FASB, AICPA and SEC
precedents requiring disclosure of "fair value." Such an appendix of precedents is essential to
any research process and reveals a persistent characteristic of FASB standard setting although
the entire reference appendix is ultimately omitted in SFAS 107. Bank regulation and
international precedents are persistently omitted from accounting standards. For example, the
1994 ED for a standard revising SFAS 105 and SFAS 107 does not refer to bank regulatory
precedent (e.g. the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) Call Report, Schedule
RC-L, Off Balance Sheet Items, FFIEC 031, 032, 033, and 034, and Item no. 12, which
defmes detennination of notional amounts of forward contracts for reporting purposes). This
level of guidance is also omitted fromFASB or EITF pUblications. Because of omitted
relevant regulatory accounting principles (RAP), the FASB gives less guidance to itself and to
"nonbanks," who need help the most, if only by analogy.
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DISCLOSURE OF HEDGING POLICIES
Belk and Glaum (1990) provide evidence that balance sheet exposure is managed
primarily by adjusting the currencies of lending and borrowing (i.e., hedging with
"primitives") and that exposure on future purchases and sales transactions is primarily
managed by hedging with derivatives (FXD). The implication for the present study is to
remind us that FXD are likely to be a significant, but not necessarily the primary FX hedging
and positioning strategy. To determine if positions are exposed or not, a firm would have to
summarize balance·sheet positions, off-balance-sheet positions (i.e., finn commitments), and
anticipated transactions (i.e., operating transactions or exposure) before reporting
complementary derivative positions.
SFAS 105 requires a discussion of the market risk of financial instruments with OBS
risk of accounting loss. In response to this requirement, most finns briefly summarize how
FXD are used to hedge foreign exchange risk. Table 4 summarizes these disclosures. There
are 55 references to hedges of balance sheet exposures (41 balance sheet items plus 14 net
investments in international operations). There are 23 indications of hedging commitments
and 28 indications of hedging anticipated transactions, i.e., operating exposure. Our results
are consistent with Rodriguez (1981) in that companies do not appear to be speculating,
perhaps because of asymmetric rewards associated with negative derivatives perfonnance.
We classified a policy as one of hedging if a company used any wording implying such.
Three companies clearly indicate that they do not speculate as a matter of policy.
[Table 4]
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It is likely that companies take an active currency position in anticipation of rate
changes and view this as hedging anticipated transactions. For example, Coca Cola "engages
in hedging to enhance income and cash flows denominated in foreign currencies" and
Halliburton enters into FXD "in its selective hedging of its exposure." This suggests that
differences between selectively hedging future transactions and speculation, or "taking a
view," may be in the eye of the beholder. The FASB, in SFAS 119, gives up on robust
criteria for hedging and settles for euphemisms like "end-user risk management" or
"nontrading activities."
Some companies disclose the maturity and currency of derivatives. Thirty-eight
companies- disclosed maximum maturities of open forwards. Seventeen reported maturities of
less than one year. Twelve reported forwards maturing in one year. Nine reported maturities
of greater than one year, with the latest maturity being 13 years. Multiple long-term forwards
which hedge debt are equivalent to swaps designed for the same purpose.
Seven companies disclosed the maturities of currency options. Five matured within
one year, the other two reported maximum maturities of 15 and 36 months. SFAS 119
encourages, but does not require, "gap" analysis for interest rate positions by duration and
illustrates a format for a financial entity to report exposure by repricing intervals.
Information was provided on the currency of FXD by 19 companies. However, the
level of detail varies from a description that FXD are "primarily European" to specification of
amounts of currencies purchased or sold forward and amounts of currency for buy or sell
options. Except for debt instruments, in no cases were the amounts of foreign currency
exposed assets or liabilities identified. SFAS 119 illustrates an "encouraged" format that
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provides limited information on currency-specific exposures.
The Group of Thirty (1993) estimates that from 1985 to 1989, the volume of
international new issues that were swap-driven increased steadily, reaching 70% of
international U8. dollar new issue volume and 53% of total international new issue volume.
Major borrowers monitor funding opportunities regularly by evaluating the relative pricing for
new issues and swaps across markets worldwide. Commonly, currency swap agreements
effectively establish U.S. dollar-denominated principal and interest obligations over the terms
of foreign currency denominated debt. Swaps are entered simultaneously with debt
transactions and are integral to the debt transaction. Reporting debt and swaps separately, as
is done by many companies, confuses the investor as to the substance of debt transactions.
One example of showing the economic substance of transactions, and not just legal form, is
Procter & Gamble's long-term-debt summary table that describes each major issuance of debt
with a description of the related swap in parentheses and the effective borrowing amount,
currency, and interest rate. However, Procter & Gamble did not reveal the market risk of
their derivative activities in 1992 or 1993 only to have that risk emerge in 1994 as a
significant loss and negative publicity.
One argument against requiring quantitative market-risk disclosures such as reported
by CmCORP (1994), is that some companies do not have the capacity to produce such
information (SFAS 119, ']l72). Conventional business wisdom however, is not to sign
contracts when management does not understand the risks involved. "Plain vanilla"
derivatives, si.J:nple forwards, swaps, and options are relatively easy to value. If management
chooses to enter complex derivative transactions, then it is incumbent upon them to acquire
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the expertise and technology to undertake a sensitvity analysis of changes in value in response
to changes in interest and exchange rates. The complaint filed in Gibson Greetings (GG) Vs.
Bankers Trust (BT), et al. (1994) presents a clear admission of a company entering into
transactions without adequately understanding the attendant risks. Allegedly, BT, as adviser
and banker, sold GG complex derivatives and GG had "no capacity independently to evaluate
the benefits or risks involved in derivative transactions or to value the transactions
themselves." In short, at the time the complaint was fLled GG had lost $23 million and GG's
liability was "potentially without limit, a situation which threatened the survival of the
Company" (~ 27).
CmCORP provides a quantification of market risk previously only described verbally
and abstractly. The dollar numbers are remarkable .because market risk is reported by the
industry leader to be of low magnitude, especially compared to the credit risk numbers.
However, there is a counterparty to each of CmCORP's positions, who may not be so
consistently hedged or diversified. Interest rate and FX databases and software are available
to facilitate quantification of exposure to market risk. (For example see an article regarding
l.P.Morgan & Co. in the October 11, 1994 Wall Street Journal.) Since the need for
quantification of market risk exposure has been identified and the technology exists for
calculation, perhaps the time has come for the FASB or the SEC to require its disclosure.
CONCLUSIONS
Three factors likely reduce the willingness of management to support requirements for
..
disclosure of exposure to currency risk and the effect of FXD on this exposure. First, is
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concern that disclosures may convey strategic infonnation to competitors. Second, and
perhaps more specious, specific infonnation on the use of derivatives increases management
exposure to shareholder lawsuits alleging misuse of corporate resources. For example,
shareholders sued Procter & Gamble following their disclosure of $102 million losses on
interest rate swaps in the first quarter of 1994. Third, disclosures impose a level of costs
which are not always commensurate with their materiality to nonfinancial entities.
Quantitative disclosures consist primarily of notional principal amounts of FXD
outstanding at year-end. The Group of Thirty (1993) suggests that notional principal amounts
of FXD measure activity level but do not measure risk exposure (either credit or market risk)
for three main reasons. First, notional principal outstanding fails to account for offsetting
exposures. Second, transactions of various maturities are simply added without accounting
for the differing sensitivities of the values of the contracts to changes in the value of the
underlying (e.g., the exchange rate risk of a one year option is not equal to that of a ten-year
swap despite SFAS 105 treating the notional principal amounts the same). Finally, different
types of derivatives (e.g., options versus swaps) h~ve substantially different risk profiles.
SFAS 119 (FASB 1994) provides clarification and expansion of qualitative disclosures
on derivatives and new quantitative information on average fair values of derivatives held for
trading purposes. Other quantitative disclosures are either optional or have been withdrawn.
A major concern to investors is quantifying market risk which has yet to be directly
addressed. The result is that empirical research potential is limited and aggregation of
derivative disclosures to test cross-sectional and time series variation for policy inferences is
delayed.
23
Large corporate losses reported in 1994 (e.g., Procter & Gamble and Gibson
Greeting's, Derivatives Strategy 1994) resulted from rapid market movements (market risk)
and from management not properly controlling exposure to market risk (i.e., operating risk) of
complex derivative contracts in which they had entered. The analysis of our survey, leads to
several conclusions. First, all major dealers and some users report the quantified credit risk
information required by the FASB. Considering the lack of reported problems to date and the
magnitudes disclosed by manufacturers, credit risk does not appear to be a primary disclosure
issue. Second, market risk disclosure is deficient because of inadequate quantification of
some measure of value-at-risk in view of the reporting of large derivatives losses. Third,
revelations by some managements that they were unaware of and were not controlling risks
involved in derivative contracts undertaken (see the press release of Procter & Gamble and
the law suit of Gibson Greetings against Bankers Trust) suggest operating risk is an area of
concern. Arguably, operating risk relates to corporate controls and therefore is not directly
within the FASB 's jurisdiction. However, requiring quantification of market risk (as well as
credit risk) would encourage greater consideration of value at risk in decision making, thus
reducing operating risk and providing useful information to investors and management.
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Summary of Exposure to Risks
From Foreign Exchange Derivatives (FXD)
Is there exposure to the indicated risk
for FXD used to:
Type of Risk Hedge Speculate
Market Risk+ No* Yes***
Credit Risk++ Yes** Yes**
+Market risk refers to the risk of loss of market price from unexpected changes in exchange or
interest rates.
++Credit risk is the potential loss resulting from counter-party non-performance.
*Net effect of hedge instrument and exposed position that is being hedged.
**From an historical cost perspective, there is credit risk exposure for unrealized gains on the
FXD. If there is an unrealized loss, only the firm's counter-party is exposed to credit loss.
Exceptions are futures and written options. Gains and losses on futures contracts traded on
exchanges are settled in cash daily. Therefore, credit risk is minimal. The counterparty to a
written option (i.e., the purchaser) has no performance obligations under the option.
***From an historical cost perspective, the maximum possible loss on purchased options are the





Summary of Foreign Exchange Derivative Disclosures: Six Major Dealer Banks
1993 1992 Percent
Change
$ million % total assets $ million % total assets 19,93/1992
Notional principal amount
FX forwards, spots, $3,277,512 371.8 % $2,639,892 344.9 % +24.2%
futures
FX swaps $233,712 26.5 % $244,553 31.9 % - 4.4 %
FX options $672,716 76.3 % $345,748 45.2 % + 94.6 %
Total FXD $4,183,940 474.7 % $3,230.193 422.1 % + 29.5 %
Total assets on balance sheet $881,468 100.0 % $765,313 100.0 % + 15.2 %
Maximum Exposure to Credit $53,998 6.1% $80,357 10.5% -32.8%
loss for FXD (Unrealized
exchange gains)
% of Stockholders' equity 85.6% 149.1%
% of notional prin. amount 1.3% 2.5%
FX Trading Income $2,330 0.3% $2,701 0.4% -13.7%
% of Income before taxes 17.4% 30.3%




Table 3~ Summary of FXD Disclosures
Panel A: Number of U.S. Manufacturing Finns in Sample Reporting
Notional Values (NV), Book Values (BV), and Fair Values (FV)
Number of Number of Companies Reporting Amounts
Companies
in Sample NV,BV,FV NV, FV, NV, BV FV,BV NV FV BV No
Only Only 'Only Only Only Only Disclosure
98 29 11 0 2 42 1 0 13
100% 30% 11% 0% 2% 43% 1% 0% 13%
" Panel B: Notional Amount of Disclosed FXD
No. of Notional Amount Ratio of Notional Value
Companies ($000,000) to Total Assets
Category of FXD - % of Reporting $
Mean Median Mean Median Min MaxTotal Sample of 98 Amounts
Forwards ~ 65% 64 $1261 $340 .077 .048 0 .636
Swaps - 26% 26 $351 $161 .035 .011 .004 .120
Options - 12% 12 $508 $234 .038 .022 0 .137
Not disclosed separately - 21 % 21 $1497 $701 .104 .072 .011 .443
Total Users - 84% 82 $1554 $569 .103 .068 0 .636
Out of the total sample of 98 U.S. companies 82 reported using FXD. FXD are foreign currency financial instruments with off-
balance-sheet risk of accounting loss. NV, BV, and FV are notional, book and fair values, respectively.
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Table 3, Panel C: Book Value of Disclosed FXD
Category Book Values of Reported FXD($OOO,OOO) Ratio of Book to Notional Values
No. Reporting Mean Amount Median No. Reporting Mean Amount Median
Forwards 16 $37 $4. 12 .062 .008
Swaps 3 $64 $11 0 - -
Options 4 $30 $38 0 - .
Not Separated 8 $32 $6 6 .025 .009
Total 31 $38 $4 27 .029 .006
Panel D: Fair Value of Disclosed FXD
Category Fair Values of Reported FXD ($000,000) Ratio of Fair to Notional Values
No. Reporting Mean Amount Median No. Reporting Mean Amount Median
Forwards 25 $32 $6 21 .108 $.009
Swaps 6 $35 $6 0 - -
Options 5 $22 $23 0 - -
Not Separated 11 $66 $21 9 .043 $.027
Total Reporting 43 $43 $8 38 .041 $.018
Panels C and D present summary statistics on companies that disclosed both notional and book (C) or fair (D) values for the indicated category.
Some companies reported different levels of detail of notional and fair values or amounts in non-matching categories. Therefore, Total Reporting
the Ratio of Book (Fair) to Notional Values, 27 (38) companies exceeds the sum of the number of companies reporting individual ratio categories,
12+6 or 18 (21+9 or 30). Two companies reported $0 for notional, book, and fair values. These two companies are considered as reporting





Summary of Manufacturing Companies' Policy Statements on
Exposure to Currency Exchange-Rate Changes
Reported Descnption of What is Hedged No. of References





Foreign currency investments (Foreign 3
currency denominated securities)
Liabilities- Payables 1
Short term borrowings 1
Long term debt (Foreign currency 1
bonds and warrants)
Liabilities (Debts) 9
To provide local currency debt to subs
1
Balance Sht- Net monetary assets (Receivables and
payables, Receivables, payables and 11
other commitments, Monetary assets
and liabilities)
Balance Sheet (Assets and liabilities) . ~
Total policy references to balance sheet items 41
Net investments in international operations 14





Summary of Manufacturing Companies' Policy Statements on
Exposure to Currency Exchange-Rate Changes
Reported Description of What is Hedged No. of
(Alternative wording interpreted as equivalent) References
Transactions with firm commitments:
Finn commitments (Commitments) 15
Sales commitments (Export sales) I
Inventory purchase commitments with specific supplier 1
Capital expenditures (Commitments for Property, Plant and Equipment) 1
Interco transactions (lnterco payables and receivables) 2
Interco dividends and royalties (Dividends from sub) 2
Sale of German sub 1
Total commitments 23
"Does not hedge non-transaction exposure" 1
Total Balance Sheet (from page I) 55
Total Accounting Exposure 79
Anticipated transactions (i.e., Operating exposure):
Revenues (Anticipated sales commitments, probable anticipated sales, anticipated interco 5
sales, future export commitments, future exports)
Expected inventory purchases 1
Income and cash flows (Transactions, anticipated transactions, cash flow transactions,
operating activities, economic exposure, operational exposure, currency fluctuations on 22
operations, operating income, sales and purchases)
Total anticipated transactions (I.e., Operating exposure) 28
General comments to reduce exposure With, no specific comment
.!l
Total References to Hedging Exposure 124
No statement on policy: 17
Specific statement indicating no speculation: 3
Reported statement indicating speculation: 1
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